Sample policy · Independent specialist doctor

Medical emergencies and the deteriorating patient policy (independent specialist doctor)

Statutory anchor: Regulation 12 (safe care and treatment), Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/2936). This policy also engages Regulation 18 (staffing) for life-support and anaphylaxis training and competence. · primary source

1. What the regulation says

Care and treatment must be provided in a safe way for service users. (Reg 12(1) (the headline duty))

assessing the risks to the health and safety of service users of receiving the care or treatment, (Reg 12(2)(a) (risk assessment))

doing all that is reasonably practicable to mitigate any such risks, (Reg 12(2)(b) (risk mitigation))

ensuring that persons providing care or treatment to service users have the qualifications, competence, skills and experience to do so safely, (Reg 12(2)(c) (staff competence))

ensuring that the equipment used by the service provider for providing care or treatment to a service user is safe for such use and is used in a safe way, (Reg 12(2)(e) (equipment safety))

where equipment or medicines are supplied by the service provider, ensuring that there are sufficient quantities of these to ensure the safety of service users and to meet their needs, (Reg 12(2)(f) (sufficient equipment + medicines supply))

where responsibility for the care and treatment of service users is shared with, or transferred to, other persons, working with such other persons, service users and other appropriate persons to ensure that timely care planning takes place to ensure the health, safety and welfare of the service users. (Reg 12(2)(i) (shared / transferred responsibility))

Regulation 18 adds the staffing and competence duties that this policy operationalises for life-support and anaphylaxis training:

Sufficient numbers of suitably qualified, competent, skilled and experienced persons must be deployed in order to meet the requirements of this Part. (Reg 18(1): the headline duty)

receive such appropriate support, training, professional development, supervision and appraisal as is necessary to enable them to carry out the duties they are employed to perform. (Reg 18(2)(a): support, training, supervision and appraisal)

The full text is at https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/2936/regulation/12 and https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/2936/regulation/18. Where this policy and the regulation diverge, the regulation wins.

2. Plain-English summary

Care and treatment must be provided in a safe way. The regulation lists the areas a provider must address, including risk assessment, risk mitigation, staff competence, safe premises, safe equipment, sufficient equipment and medicines, medicines safety, infection prevention and shared-care planning. Regulation 12 is central to CQC's safety expectations. For the training and competence elements of this policy, Regulation 18 requires you to deploy enough suitably qualified, competent, skilled and experienced staff, and to give them the support, training, professional development, supervision and appraisal necessary to carry out their duties.

3. Purpose

A medical emergency can happen in any clinic: a collapse, anaphylaxis, chest pain, a faint that does not recover. In a single-handed practice there is no crash team down the corridor, so the practice has to be ready to recognise and treat an emergency and get the patient to hospital safely. This policy sets out how the practice prepares for, recognises and manages a medical emergency and a deteriorating patient.

The practice must verify this policy against current Resuscitation Council UK guidance before adoption.

4. Sources to verify before adoption

5. Scope

This policy applies to:

6. Anticipating the emergencies that could occur

The practice identifies the emergencies most likely to arise from the patients it sees and the procedures it does (for example anaphylaxis after an injection, a vasovagal collapse, chest pain, hypoglycaemia, or a complication of a procedure), and prepares for them.

7. Equipment and drugs

8. Recognising deterioration

9. Managing an emergency

When an emergency occurs the practice:

10. After an event

Operational controls to adapt

Roles and responsibilities

Emergency response procedure

  1. Complete pre-session readiness checks. Confirm emergency drugs, oxygen where held, AED, airway equipment, suction where held, observation equipment and emergency contact routes are available before clinical work starts.
  2. Recognise deterioration early. Any collapse, chest pain, breathing difficulty, allergic reaction, seizure, severe bleeding, severe pain, confusion or abnormal observations is treated as urgent until assessed.
  3. Use a structured assessment. Assess airway, breathing, circulation, disability and exposure, record observations and repeat them at clinically appropriate intervals.
  4. Call 999 early. Do not wait for full collapse where the practice cannot safely manage the risk on site. Record the call time and reference if available.
  5. Treat within competence. Follow current emergency algorithms, including anaphylaxis and basic life support, and record medicines, dose, route, batch where relevant and time.
  6. Allocate roles. One person leads, one calls emergency services, one brings equipment, one records times and one manages privacy and other patients where staffing allows.
  7. Give a structured handover. Use a clear summary of situation, background, assessment and response, including observations, treatment given, medicines, allergies and relevant history.
  8. Recover the system after the event. Restock equipment, replace medicines, document the event, debrief, decide on duty of candour and CQC notification, and open improvement actions.

Records and register links

The emergency-readiness and event record should include:

Missing equipment, expired medicines, delayed 999 calls, unclear event records, overdue training and repeat drill failures are opened on the incident, risk or improvement-actions register.

11. Training and drills

12. Audit cadence

The practice checks, on a stated cadence, that:

The doctor and the Registered Manager review the results and record the improvement actions that follow.

13. Sources and further reading

This template is based on CQC's guidance for providers and managers, the Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, and other topic-specific legislation and guidance listed below. It is a starting point for adaptation, not a substitute for legal, clinical, HR, safeguarding or specialist professional advice.

Related reading

14. When to seek further advice

Seek specialist advice where the issue involves serious harm, safeguarding, deprivation of liberty, restraint, children, professional misconduct, controlled drugs, radiation, termination of pregnancy, infection outbreak, water safety, employment dismissal, DBS barring referral, or regulatory enforcement.

15. Document control

Version Date Author Changes
v1.1 2026-07-14 Verivius (sample) Added emergency-role ownership, response procedure, readiness records, register links and related reading.
v1 2026-06-10 Verivius (sample) Conformed to the Verivius policy standard. Original purpose, scope and operational sections preserved and renumbered.

This sample policy template was issued by Verivius. It is a template, not a substitute for legal advice or the tenant's own policy-development process. Where this template and live law or regulator guidance diverge, the live source wins.

What good looks like here

Written from an ex-CQC inspector's chair, but the point is safe, well-led care your team can stand behind. Each row shows what strong evidence looks like, what thin evidence looks like, and where the expectation comes from.

In a single-handed practice the clinician who was mid-consultation is also the resuscitation team: the same person has to hold the airway, draw up the adrenaline, allocate whatever roles are available and get 999 on the phone, with nobody to take a job off them. That is why readiness has to be built before the session starts rather than assembled during it, and why an unchecked kit or an out-of-date adrenaline ampoule carries far more weight here than somewhere a second trolley is a few steps away. The decisions that shape the outcome all land inside a few minutes: calling early instead of managing on alone, treating within competence, handing over cleanly to the ambulance crew. Almost nobody else is in the room to corroborate them, so for the patient and their family the record written afterwards is often the only account they will ever receive of what happened to them in that chair. A practice that debriefs the faint that resolved as well as the collapse that reached hospital finds the gap in its kit, its roles or its training while the stakes are still low.

  1. Emergency drugs and equipment are present, in date and checked, with the check recorded, not a kit assumed to be ready. What matters when a patient collapses in the chair is in-date adrenaline, a working automated external defibrillator (AED) and dated check records, including the check made after any use.

    Strong evidence: The emergency equipment and medicine check record showing date, checker, batch, expiry, missing items and corrective action (equipment-and-drugs section and register links).

    Weak evidence: A kit tick-sheet with a column of identical ticks, one signature covering several months, and no batch numbers or expiry dates written against the adrenaline. The clearest tell is a run of unbroken checks with no extra entry on the day the kit was actually opened and used, and nothing showing the defibrillator pads and battery were looked at or that the missing item found last time was ever replaced.

    What the regulator expects to see. Not a law in itself, but CQC judges you against it, so an inspector will look for it and expect a reason where you depart from it.
  2. The doctor and any staff are trained in life support and anaphylaxis treatment to the level the work requires and are in date, with drills actually run, not training assumed. This is the Regulation 18 competence duty carried into the minutes when a patient stops breathing.

    Strong evidence: Staff life-support, anaphylaxis and emergency-drill training records with next refresher dates (training-and-drills section and register links).

    Weak evidence: A training matrix carrying a certificate date against each name but no level, so nobody can tell whether the training matches the injections and procedures actually done on site. Weak too where anaphylaxis is folded into a general online module and the next refresher date is left blank. The drills the practice commits itself to in this policy are weak evidence where they exist only as an intention in the audit plan, with no dated record of who took part and what the run revealed.

    A legal duty. This comes from legislation that applies to your service, so meeting it is not optional. The exact provision is cited beneath the badge.

    Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, reg 18(2)(a) (training and support as is necessary to enable staff to carry out the duties they are employed to perform), with reg 12(2)(c) (qualifications, competence, skills and experience to provide care safely)

  3. 999 is called early, with the call time recorded, rather than after a full collapse the practice cannot manage on site.

    Strong evidence: The event timeline recording the 999 call time and the ambulance handover (emergency-response procedure and register links).

    Weak evidence: The event note reads "ambulance called" with no clock time, so the gap between the first abnormal observation and the 999 call cannot be reconstructed by anyone reviewing it afterwards. Weak too where the timeline begins at the ambulance arrival, or where the record shows a long stretch of on-site treatment and the call reads as a last resort rather than an early decision. Writing the clock time against the call is a Verivius default rather than a legal requirement, and it is what makes an early call visible to anyone reading the record later.

    The recognised standard from a professional or clinical body, such as NICE or a royal college. Not a legal duty, but the accepted mark of safe practice, and a departure needs a documented reason.
  4. Every emergency is recorded in full, opened as a patient-safety incident and then debriefed, not treated clinically and closed without review.

    Strong evidence: The event record (timeline, observations, ABCDE (airway, breathing, circulation, disability, exposure) findings, treatment, medicines) and the debrief notes with the linked incident reference (after-an-event section and register links).

    Weak evidence: The clinical record describes the treatment well and then stops: no incident reference, no debrief note, and the only closing line is that the patient recovered and no further action was needed. Weak too where debriefs happen for the events that reached hospital but never for the faint that resolved in the chair, so the near-misses that would have exposed a gap in the kit or in who does what are never looked at.

    Our recommended baseline. Not a legal or regulatory requirement, but a sensible standard we suggest where the rules leave the detail to you. Adapt it to your service.
  5. After an event, the duty-of-candour decision and the separate CQC statutory-notification decision are each made and recorded. Both are reached on their own terms rather than candour being assumed: the Regulation 20 duty arises only where the harm meets the notifiable safety incident threshold, which is set at reg 20(8) for a health service body and at reg 20(9) for every other registered person, an independent practice included. Candour is owed to the person and is not itself a notification to CQC, and neither decision discharges the other.

    Strong evidence: The debrief notes recording the duty-of-candour decision and the CQC statutory-notification decision, with the learning (after-an-event section and register links).

    Weak evidence: A debrief that records "duty of candour not applicable" with no reasoning tested against the notifiable safety incident threshold, or the reverse, candour marked as done because the doctor spoke to the patient, with nothing showing an apology, an account of the facts known at that point, what further enquiries will follow, or the written notification that has to follow the conversation. Weak too where a single line covers both decisions, so it is impossible to tell whether the separate CQC statutory-notification question was ever asked at all.

    A legal duty. This comes from legislation that applies to your service, so meeting it is not optional. The exact provision is cited beneath the badge.

    Health and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014, reg 20(2)-(4) and the notifiable safety incident threshold at reg 20(8)-(9); Care Quality Commission (Registration) Regulations 2009, regs 16-18

Last verified 20 July 2026

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Last reviewed 10 June 2026